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EXPLORING A VYGOTSKIAN THEORY OF EDUCATION
AND ITS EVOLUTIONARY FOUNDATIONS
Aline Nardo
Moray House School of Education and Sport
University of Edinburgh
Abstract. Despite his popularity in educational discourses, Lev S. Vygotsky tends to be read mainly as
an educational psychologist or learning theorist. His potential contribution to a theory of education
remains largely undiscussed. The Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD) is often misunderstood as
a sort of “educational tool,” which severely reduces the richness of the concept emerging from
Vygotsky’s works. In this essay, Aline Nardo argues that acknowledging the evolutionary underpinnings
in Vygotsky’s thinking would enrich an educational discussion of Vygotsky. This substrate in Vygotsky’s
educational works, she argues, has been strikingly underappreciated, and her analysis seeks to address
this gap by building upon the analogy between Vygotsky’s Marxist negation of a Darwinian adaptation
paradigm and his conceptual differentiation between learning and development in order to draw out
the pedagogical dimension of the ZPD. Pedagogical interaction, in an evolutionary reading of Vygotsky,
is qualitatively different from peer interactions, as it is connected to development rather than learning.
This perspective, Nardo concludes, has important implications for the role of the teacher and a definition
of “the pedagogical.”
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Introduction
Since the 1960s, Lev S. Vygotsky has gained increasing popularity across
educational discourses — in particular, in the context of constructivist pedagogies
and teacher education.1 It seems, however, that within these discourses Vygotsky
tends to be read primarily as an educational psychologist or learning theorist,
while his contribution to a theory of education remains largely unexplored. In this
paper I will argue that the absence of Vygotsky’s ideas from educational theory
presents a missed opportunity, leaving unacknowledged his timely commentary
on the role of the teacher. Specifically, I propose that a focus on the evolutionary
underpinnings in Vygotsky’s thought may enhance our understanding of the
educational contribution of his works.
The Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD) is one of the most well-known
educational concepts of Vygotsky.2 Despite its popularity, it is often used
simplistically as “a special kind of educational technique,”3 suggesting that
1. On this point, see Vasily Davydov, “The Influence of L. S. Vygotsky on Education Theory, Research,
and Practice,” Educational Researcher 24, no. 3 (1995): 12–21; and Wolff-Michael Roth and Alfredo Jor-
net, Understanding Educational Psychology: A Late Vygotskian, Spinozist Approach (Berlin: Springer,
2017), 1.
2. Alex Kozulin, “Vygotsky’s Theory of Cognitive Development,” International Encyclopedia of Social
and Behavioral Sciences, vol. 25, ed. J. D. Wright (Oxford: Elsevier, 2015), 322–328; and Seth Chaiklin,
“The Zone of Proximal Development in Vygotsky’s Analysis of Learning and Instruction,” in Vygotsky’s
Educational Theory in Cultural Context, ed. Alex Kozulin, Boris Gindis, Vladimir S. Ageyev, and
Suzanne Miller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 26.
3. Roth and Jornet, Understanding Educational Psychology, 149.
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meaningful learning processes are externally determinable. Frequently associ-
ated with the term “scaffolding” — particularly in the context of constructivist
pedagogies — such instrumental readings of Vygotsky’s ZPD are widespread.4
From the understanding of Vygotsky developed in this paper, such a concep-
tion of the ZPD is problematic. First of all, the idea of the ZPD as a technique
eradicates the inherent transformative potential of his concept of education by
neglecting Vygotsky’s emphasis on individual and communal agency in devel-
opment and evolution.5 Furthermore — and this is the main point of this paper
— an understanding of the ZPD as an “educational technique” reduces the
complexity of pedagogical interaction and thereby evokes an idea of teaching as
merely technical know-how. Such a concept of teaching does not only neglect
the contingency and dialogic nature of the pedagogical relationship, but also
feeds into the idea that teachers are replaceable by technologies and intelli-
gent machines. By systematically revisiting the evolutionary underpinnings in
Vygotsky’s thinking, I aim to contribute to a re-positioning of Vygotsky’s edu-
cational theory and pedagogy and use that perspective to reflect on the role of
teachers today.
There prevails a striking underappreciation of the evolutionary underpinnings
in Vygotsky’s works with regard to their educational consequences.6 While Vygot-
sky’s integration of Darwinism has been discussed in other disciplines —indeed,
at times even with some consideration of educationally relevant concepts such
as “development”7 — there exists, to my knowledge, no comprehensive analysis
of the evolutionary underpinnings in Vygotsky’s educationally relevant works that
focuses on the pedagogical dimension of “the artificial development of the child.”8
The most in-depth analysis of Vygotsky’s adoption of Darwinism in the context of
education can be found in the work of Anna Stetsenko. Stetsenko deconstructs a
concept of the ZPD as externally determinable and emphasizes the individual’s
agency in her/his own development. While fully agreeing with her emphasis on
4. Peter Smagorinsky, “Is Instructional Scaffolding Actually Vygotskian, and Why Should It Matter to
Literacy Teachers?,” Journal of Adolescent & Adult Literacy 62, no. 3 (2018): 253–257.
5. Anna Stetsenko, The Transformative Mind: Expanding Vygotsky’s Approach to Development and
Education (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
6. Ibid.
7. James Wertsch, Vygotsky and the Social Formation of Mind (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1985), 23, 33; Anna Stetsenko, “Darwin and Vygotsky on Development: An Exegesis on Human
Nature,” in Children, Development, and Education: Cultural, Historical, Anthropological Perspectives,
ed. Michaelis Kontopodis, Christoph Wulf, and Bernd Fichtner (Berlin: Springer, 2011).
8. Lev S. Vygotsky, The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions (1930), ed. Robert
Rieber, trans. Marie J. Hall, vol. 4 of The Collected Works of L. S. Vygotsky (New York: Plenum, 1987),
110.
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School of Education and Sport, Holyrood Rd, Edinburgh EH8 8AQ; e-mail <aline.nardo@ed.ac.uk>. Her
primary areas of scholarship are philosophy of education, in particular the works of John Dewey, and
evolutionary educational theory.
Nardo Exploring a Vygotskian Theory of Education 333
individual agency, I argue that in defining the ZPD as a “collectively created”9 path
of development, something essential about pedagogical interaction — described
by Klaus Prange as Zeigen (showing)10 — might be lost. In Stetsenko’s efforts to
emphasize the student’s agency, the qualitative difference of the pedagogical rela-
tionship in contrast to collaborative processes among peers is obscured, or at least
remains largely undiscussed. In consequence, the role and responsibility of the
teacher, as well as the significance of the pedagogical dimension in Vygotsky’s
account of individual development and human evolution, fall by the wayside.
In the reading of Vygotsky proposed in this paper, teaching is associated with
a particular quality of “learning” — which Vygotsky refers to as “Development”11
— that is different from processes of learning that occur with peers or in interaction
with the material world. I argue that Vygotsky’s Marxist negation of a Darwinian
adaptation paradigm can enrich our understanding of that qualitative difference
in mental development and, in particular, might help us in better understanding
the educational dimension of that qualitative change, “the leap” from learning to
Development.
This paper is divided into three main sections. First, I introduce Vygotsky’s
concept of evolution. Second, I draw out the analogies between his idea of human
evolution and individual development. In particular, I focus on the distinction
between learning as a continuous process, and Development as a discontinu-
ous process involving both biological inheritance and its sociocultural transcen-
dence.12 In section three, I discuss the specific role that Vygotsky assigned to
pedagogical interaction within these processes of transcendence and present an
in-depth analysis of their rootedness in his evolutionism. In concluding this paper,
I discuss the consequences of the proposed evolutionary reading of Vygotsky’s edu-
cational works for a new philosophy of teaching and instruction.
Vygotsky’s Concept of Evolution
The influence of Darwinism on Vygotsky’s works is less explicit than other
intellectual traditions he drew from, such as Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit or
Spinoza’s monist materialism.13 Nonetheless, with the anti-essentialist idea of
nature and the historical perspective on development that he propagated, Vygotsky
“was profoundly indebted to Darwin’s idea of evolution.”14 In this paper, I focus
9. Stetsenko, The Transformative Mind, 326.
10. Klaus Prange, Pädagogik als Erfahrungsprozess [Pedagogy as a process of experience] (Stuttgart,
Germany: Klett-Cotta, 1987).
11. In this paper, I use “Development” with a capital D when referring to Vygotsky’s particular concept
of individual development.
12. Wertsch, Vygotsky and the Social Formation of Mind, 19.
13. On these themes, see Manolis Dafermos, Rethinking Cultural-Historical Theory: A Dialectical
Perspective to Vygotsky (Berlin: Springer, 2018), 75; and Jan Derry, Vygotsky: Philosophy and Education
(Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell, 2013), 110.
14. Stetsenko, The Transformative Mind, 133.
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on Vygotsky’s concept of adaptation. I argue that the way he came to integrate —
and ultimately negate — a Darwinian idea of adaptation has profound implications
for his concept of education, and, in particular, his understanding of the role of the
teacher. That is, because in contrast to other relevant thinkers in education who
drew from evolutionary theory — such as Dewey15 — Vygotsky’s particular evo-
lutionary perspective is based on the partial rejection of the Darwinian principle
of adaptation. While Dewey used a Darwinian concept of adaptation to concep-
tualize education as growth16 — a cumulative adaptive movement transforming
individuals and their environments simultaneously — on Vygotsky’s view, indi-
vidual development is characterized by breaks and “leaps.” In Vygotsky’s account,
human evolution “performed” a “shift away from adaptation.”17 This “shift away”
as a distinctive feature of human evolution, I will argue in part two of this paper,
is a key component of Vygotsky’s concept of pedagogical interaction, where it rep-
resents a qualitative shift from learning to Development.
Vygotsky’s Negation of the Darwinian Adaptation Paradigm
Vygotsky defines adaptation as “the fundamental and universal law of devel-
opment and life of organisms.”18 He considered the human mind to be a product of
active adaptation “to new or changing conditions in the external environment.”19
Despite Vygotsky’s contention that “the biological expediency of mind here serves
as the basic explanatory principle,”20 he deemed the framework of Darwinian adap-
tation insufficient to explain fully the emergence of “higher mental functions”21
in human evolution as qualitatively distinct from other forms of animal cognition.
“Somewhere, in some specific stage of animal development,” he writes,
a qualitative change in the development of brain processes took place, which, on the one hand,
was prepared by the whole preceding course of development, but, on the other hand, was a leap
that could not be mechanically reduced to more simple phenomena.22
15. Aline Nardo, “The Evolutionary Foundations of John Dewey’s Concept of Growth and Its Meaning
for His Educational Theory,” Zeitschrift für Pädagogik 64, no. 6 (2018): 852–870.
16. John Dewey, Democracy and Education (1916), in vol. 9 of John Dewey: The Middle Works,
1899–1924, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008), 4-375.
17. Anna Stetsenko, “Personhood: An Activist Project of Historical Becoming through Collaborative
Pursuits of Social Transformation,” New Ideas in Psychology 30, no. 1 (2012): 148.
18. Lev S. Vygotsky, Problems of the Theory and History of Psychology, ed. Robert Rieber and Jeffrey




21. Lev S. Vygotsky, “Tool and Sign in the Development of the Child” (1930), in Scientific Legacy, ed.
Robert Rieber, trans. Marie J. Hall, vol. 6 of The Collected Works of L. S. Vygotsky (New York: Plenum,
1987), 22.
22. Ibid., 113 (emphasis added).
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That “leap” in human cognition, Vygotsky suggested, fundamentally altered
the trajectory of human evolution. “In our view,” he writes, “a fundamental
difference distinguishes the product of biological evolution (i.e. the natural form
of thinking) from the historically emerging forms of human intellect.”23 After the
“leap,” following a Vygotskian perspective, “human nature is seen as superseding
these origins and transcending any biological imperatives, allowing for a ‘leap’
into the realm of freedom and self-determination.”24 Rather than being merely
adaptive, henceforth, human activity is, to use the words of Stetsenko, “directed
at transforming the world (and therefore, always purposeful or goal-directed).”25
The Social Dimension of the “Leap”
To conceptualize the “leap” — from biology to the “new plane”26 of
“‘purposeful and goal-directed transformation of the world” through culture
and human-made history — Vygotsky had to partially reject a Darwinian account
of evolution.27 Although embracing an understanding of individual development
as a fundamentally contingent and environment-dependent process, Vygotsky also
wanted to put stronger emphasis on the “dynamic relations between organisms
and their world as the driving force of evolutionary change.”28
To define these dynamic relations, Vygotsky drew from historical material-
ism.29 Historical materialism focuses on the relationship between the material
reality and the forces of production — that is, the means and materials accessible to
human labor — available to a group of individuals who collaborate in their attempt
“to alter their natural environment to suit their particular needs.”30 In a histori-
cal materialist view, “the development of history is not determined by the desires
or actions of specific human subjects, but instead shaped by the objective facts
of material existence.”31 The “leap” in human cognition, Vygotsky believed, was
directly connected to social interaction and collaboration within these particular
material and sociocultural contexts. The mind, “and all individual objectives, that
is, processes such as contemplating, goal setting, planning, understanding, feeling,
23. Ibid., 160.
24. Stetsenko, “Darwin and Vygotsky on Development,” 26.
25. Anna Stetsenko, “Teaching-Learning and Development as Activist Projects of Historical Becoming:
Expanding Vygotsky’s Approach to Pedagogy,” Pedagogies: An International Journal 5, no. 2 (2009): 9
(emphasis added).
26. Vygotsky, “Tool and Sign in the Development of the Child,” 34.
27. Dafermos, Rethinking Cultural-Historical Theory, 188.
28. Stetsenko, The Transformative Mind, 115.
29. Vygotsky, Problems of the Theory and History of Psychology, 338.
30. Ian Buchanan, “Historical Materialism,” in Dictionary of Critical Theory, ed. Ian Buchanan (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2018), n.p.
31. Ibid., n.p.
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thinking, and so on,” are in his view “instantiations of collaborative practices”
within specific contexts.32
Vygotsky’s Theory of Human Cognition in the Light of Contemporary
Science
Vygotsky doubtlessly made a significant and lasting contribution to how we
think about human cognition and intelligence.33 There are, however, several points
in Vygotsky’s thinking that, from the perspective of contemporary science, raise
some questions. The evidence for and against a qualitative or functional differen-
tiation between human and animal cognition, for example, is a matter of ongoing
discussion.34 Also Vygotsky’s idea of the “leap” is discussed controversially within
the neo-Darwinist tradition that propagates a continuous, gradual view of the evo-
lution of biology and culture.35
It lies outside this paper’s scope to unpack these questions of consistency of
Vygotsky’s works with contemporary science. For the educational argument to be
developed here, the way Vygotsky came to reject a purely Darwinian account of
human cognitive development remains of key significance in spite of scientific
discourses that might put the legitimacy of some of his claims up for question.36
Vygotsky’s concept of evolution allows us to understand better his idea of edu-
cation and pedagogical interaction. That is because, as I will argue in this paper,
his idea of education as the direction of learning and Development can be under-
stood in analogy to his concept of the “evolutionary leap” induced by collaborative
transformative activity. In Vygotsky’s understanding of the evolution of the human
species, the trajectory changed, superseding an adaptive relationship through col-
laborative activity. On the level of individual development, analogously, it is a
particular kind of social interaction that enables “leaps” from learning to Devel-
opment. Teaching, in ontogenetic developments, represents the particular category
of social interaction that, just like collaboration on the level of phylogenetic evo-
lution, creates a threshold for qualitative change. Before I come to discuss these
educational implications of Vygotsky’s concept of evolution in depth, in the fol-
lowing section, I discuss the social dimension of the “leap” in human evolution
and the category of “labor.”
32. Roth and Jornet, Understanding Educational Psychology, 159.
33. Olga Vasileva and Natalia Balyasnikova, “(Re)Introducing Vygotsky’s Thought: From Historical
Overview to Contemporary Psychology,” Frontiers of Psychology 10, no. 1515 (2019).
34. On the topic of animal versus human cognition, see David Premack, “Human and Animal Cognition:
Continuity and Discontinuity,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States
of America 104, no. 35 (2007): 13861–13867.
35. John Offer, “Social Change and Selectionist Thought: On Spencer, Darwin, and Runciman,” Socio-
logical Review 58, no. 2 (2010): 305–326.
36. William R. Penuel and James V. Wertsch, “Vygotsky and Identity Formation: A Sociocultural
Approach,” Educational Psychologist 30, no. 2 (1995): 85.
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Labor and Human’s “Second Nature”
In this part of the paper, I will look at different factors of individual devel-
opment — biology, social interaction, “auxiliary means,” and material as well as
sociocultural environments — and discuss some of the implications of these fac-
tors for a Vygotskian theory of education.
Labor and Individual Development
Based on the post-Darwinian understanding of evolution as a discontinuous
process, Vygotsky studied individual development as a process of qualitative trans-
formations, or “leaps.” Vygotsky argued that after the “leap,” “man is cognizant
of the developing situation,”37 anticipating and intervening with foresight in order
to achieve a desired result. That form of relating to the environment is the basis
of a “second human nature” that is qualitatively and functionally distinct from all
other animals. It is no longer defined by “adaptation but through the social practice
of human labor — the collaborative (and therefore sociocultural), transformative
practice unfolding and expanding in history.”38
The concept of labor is not only significant for Vygotsky’s particular under-
standing of human evolution, but it also informs his concept of individual cognitive
development.39 In labor, Vygotsky argued, not only is the sociocultural environ-
ment changed collaboratively, but the individual’s cognitive functions, abilities,
goals, interests, and motivations are also transformed.40 Individual development,
on his view, “is a collaborative and creative work-in-progress by people acting
together in pursuit of their goals while, in the process, always moving beyond the
status quo and its existing conditions and limitations.”41
Individual development, in Vygotsky’s understanding, is formed through labor,
by what is “taken up by people,” instead of being “shaped by imperatives of sur-
vival and competition for what is typically taken to be limited resources available
in the present, by individuals acting in solitude, each on one’s own, in maximiz-
ing individual gains while adjusting to the status quo.”42 Vygotsky maintained
that through labor — which is enabled by the evolved mental capacity to collab-
oratively transform environments — the human species “supersedes adaptation
and natural selection, that is, dialectically negates, without eliminating them.”43
37. Vygotsky, The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions, 208.
38. Stetsenko, “Darwin and Vygotsky on Development,” 32.
39. Vygotsky, The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions, 43.
40. Penuel and Wertsch, “Vygotsky and Identity Formation,” 85.
41. Stetsenko, The Transformative Mind, 35.
42. Ibid., 35, 36.
43. Stetsenko, “Personhood,” 149.
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These “historically emerging forms of human intellect”44 allowed humans to cre-
ate a new relationship with their environment, and, through the use of tools, to
create a “completely new psychological field for action.”45 Learning takes up a
key role within the individual’s existence and development beyond adaptation.
Historical Experience and Learning
Vygotsky believed that human development essentially has two components.
The first is biological, based on what he called “hereditary” or “physically inher-
ited experience.”46 Hereditary experience is “formed by the change in their organs
under the influence of certain environmental influences”47 and in this way sub-
mitted to the Darwinian principle of natural selection. Hereditary experiences are
transmitted through physical inheritance. The second form of development “con-
sists in the change in the animal’s behavior without a change in the structure of the
body.”48 It is non-hereditary, “historical experience”49 that allows the individual
to overturn their hereditary experience, to negate it in relation to the sociocultural
reality they inhabit.
Inherent to the concept of historical experience is Vygotsky’s idea of learning
and — as Vygotsky believed — the unique human possibility to create a qualita-
tively and functionally different relationship to the environment. While Vygotsky
acknowledged that animals are also able to have historical experiences and, thus,
learn in relation to their particular environment, he deemed other animals’ ability
to learn and use tools to be much more rudimentary than the human capacity to
learn through the creation and use of “auxiliary means” in labor.50 For humans,
new modes and objectives of activity become possible that lie outside of a reac-
tive/adaptive relationship to the environment.
Educational practices that aim to facilitate and direct historical experi-
ences and collaborative activities are a key component of Vygotsky’s idea of
non-hereditary adaptation. Before unpacking the educational dimension of Vygot-
sky’s concept of learning, it is important to look at the social dimension of learning
in more depth in order to understand the analogy between Vygotsky’s concept of
evolutionary and developmental “leaps.”
44. Vygotsky, Thinking and Speech, in Problems of General Psychology, ed. Robert Rieber, trans. Norris
Minick, vol. 1 of The Collected Works of L. S. Vygotsky (New York: Plenum, 1987), 160.
45. Vygotsky, “Tool and Sign in the Development of the Child,” 35.
46. Alex Kozulin, “Psychological Tools and Mediated Learning,” in Vygotsky’s Educational Theory in
Cultural Context, ed. Kozulin, Gindis, Ageyev, and Miller, 58, 68.
47. Ibid., 57.
48. Ibid. (emphasis added). On the current scientific discourse on neuroplasticity and its bearings on
education, see, for example, Antonio M. Battro, Kurt W. Fischer, and Pierre J. Léna, eds., The Educated
Brain: Essays in Neuroeducation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
49. Kozulin, “Psychological Tools and Mediated Learning,” 58.
50. Lev S. Vygotsky, Child Psychology, ed. Robert Rieber, trans. Marie J. Hall, vol. 5 of The Collected
Works of L. S. Vygotsky (New York: Plenum, 1987), 56.
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Sociogenesis and “Auxiliary Means”
Vygotsky thought of the evolution of the human species as a discontinuous
process marked by a major “leap” from active adaption to environmental pressures
to goal-directed transformation of sociocultural realities. This “leap” was granted
by certain cognitive developments that allowed humans to interact in more
complex symbolic ways and, thus, to collaborate in processes of labor.
Analogously to the “leap” in the evolution of the species through the emer-
gence of new forms of collaboration, Vygotsky thought of individual development
as fundamentally social. Individual development, on his view, is a process of
sociogenesis, which, following the definition of Wolff-Michael Roth and Alfredo
Jornet, means that “higher psychological functions originate as, not merely in
social relations, thereby generating both social facts and social persons.”51 Individ-
uals participate in the transformation of the sociocultural reality and are formed
within that process. Therein, individual consciousness develops in a process of
“thinking-for-doing”52 in a particular context. In Vygotsky’s own words, “the men-
tal nature of man represents the totality of social relations internalized and made
into functions of the individual and forms of his structure.”53
In Vygotsky, the negation of hereditary experiences — meaning their transcen-
dence, rather than replacement — takes place through the collective invention,
elaboration, and ultimate integration of “auxiliary means” into the mental activity
of the individual. Broadly speaking, auxiliary means are tools (such as signs, prac-
tices, and language) that, in the process of integration, transform into psychological
capacities or habits.54 Tools receive their meaning as tools in social interaction
(intermental) and are later transformed into psychological tools (intramental) that
allow for the internal direction of activity. Internalized tools, thus, mediate the
relationship between the individual and her/his surroundings:
In the instrumental act a new middle term is inserted between the object and the mental
operation directed at it: the psychological tool, which becomes the structural center of focus,
i.e., the aspect that functionally determines all the processes that form the instrumental act.
Any behavioral act then becomes an intellectual operation.55
As human cognition and its ability for transformative collaborative activity
emerge from social relations, language is a key component of Vygotsky’s under-
standing of individual development. Higher mental functions first exist as commu-
nication, as “means of association.”56 Through communicative speech interaction
becomes active transformative practice. Language combines the communicative,
51. Roth and Jornet, Understanding Educational Psychology, viii.
52. Ibid., 18.
53. Vygotsky, The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions, 106.
54. Dafermos, Rethinking Cultural-Historical Theory, 140.
55. Vygotsky, Problems of the Theory and History of Psychology, 87.
56. Vygotsky, Child Psychology, 169.
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interactive function with the function of meaning-making. Through language,
individual experience is shared and thus reveals its meaning “in generalization”
in the process of communication and association with others’ experiences. The
process of generalization causes thought to be “restructured as it is transformed
into speech.”57 Thinking, thus, is inherently social as it is formed in the context of
communicative purposes and language: “Thinking is for acting and speaking and
therefore marked by needs and affect.”58 In its integrated form, speech becomes
thinking, “it is converted from the reflecting accompanying function into a plan-
ning function, shifting to the beginning of the process, transferring from one oper-
ation to another.”59 Thought, Vygotsky argues, “is not expressed, but completed
in the word.”60 Language, thus, marks the “transition from direct, innate, natu-
ral forms and methods of behavior to mediated, artificial mental functions that
develop in the process of cultural development.”61
Environment and Sociocultural Reality
Vygotsky’s replacement of the adaptation paradigm is connected to his ideas
of integration and mediation: humans are no longer forced to adapt to the envi-
ronment, or pushed to direct their activities at adapting the environment to them
based on external pressures. In the light of Vygotsky’s expansion of Darwinian
adaptation, a few more words have to be said about his notion of “environment.”
That is because his understanding of labor as a collaborative activity transform-
ing environmental conditions has important repercussions for how he thought of
“environment” and, in consequence, how we can think of “educational environ-
ments” in a Vygotskian perspective.
Instead of adapting to external environments and their pressures, says Vygot-
sky, humans integrate the world into their activity, making it a constitutive part
of their nature. In this process of integration, “the natural process undergoes a pro-
found reconstruction, being converted into a circuitous, mediated act,”62 while the
tools and cultural practices themselves are also changed. As part of this process,
according to Vygotsky, cultural practices and other tools “ceas[e] to be external”
as they are “reorganized into most complex internal psychological systems.”63
The world and the individual move closer together, in the sense that the former
becomes increasingly a constitutive part of the individual’s activity; all that exists
in the sociocultural surroundings of the individual — be it material, or not — is
integrated into the individual’s mental operations. I use the term “sociocultural” to
57. Vygotsky, Thinking and Speech, 251.
58. Roth and Jornet, Understanding Educational Psychology, 6.
59. Vygotsky, Child Psychology, 114.
60. Vygotsky, Thinking and Speech, 296.
61. Vygotsky, Child Psychology, 168.
62. Vygotsky, “Tool and Sign in the Development of the Child,” 55.
63. Ibid.
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describe the “lifeworld” of the individual because in Vygotsky “culture” and “the
social” can be used virtually interchangeably as, for Vygotsky, “everything cultural
is social.”64 Tools, therein, are understood to be changing in accordance with, and
as an inducing entity of, cultural development in society. Tools are changeable
in essence; they are ontologically “in-progress” and know no static existence.65
According to this view, tools — both material and psychological — do not have
an existence outside of social practices, which breaks up the internal/external
dichotomy.
A Vygotskian understanding of environment as sociocultural reality has impor-
tant implications for the concept of an “educational environment.” The material
environment, in Vygotsky’s view, provides the conditions for collaborative activ-
ities of students, but cannot replace said activity. Only in collaboration do the
artifacts that create the “educational environment” receive their meaning and
purpose, as tools. This requires an openness that, in the context of educational
technologies and arrangements that “scaffold” the learning process to a predefined
outcome, is not easily achieved. So-called “adaptive learning systems” use artifi-
cial intelligence to tailor learning environments to individuals in order to ensure
optimal “efficiency” in reaching predefined learning outcomes. These “hard and
soft technologies that adjust content presented to the student using methodologies
such as cognitive modelling and/or sensory input”66 are difficult to reconcile with
the idea of a transformative effort of the individual in collaboration with others.
From a Relational to a Transformative Ontology
The created reality, following Vygotsky’s thought, is not a place or external
environment, but rather “a dynamic field or arena of collective practice” where
“social practices and their products are not reified at any analytical step in
their descriptions.67 This means that in Vygotsky’s argumentation, in which the
modus operandi of adaptation is superseded in human existence, “the social”
is never turned into an environment with external demands. Thus, following
the argumentation of Stetsenko, Vygotsky transcends the relational ontological
perspective of his predecessors, introducing a new transformative ontology.68
Reality, in a Vygotskian perspective, only exists in labor, and “being” in that
reality only exists as labor.69 The distinction between the individual and the world
as an external is dissolved; Vygotsky “moves beyond the relational worldview,
in considering human development specifically in the context of social and
64. Vygotsky, The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions, 106.
65. Simon Marginson and Thi Kim Anh Dang, “Vygotsky’s Sociocultural Theory in the Context of
Globalization,” Asia Pacific Journal of Education 37, no. 1 (2017): 119.
66. Amy Adcock and Richard Van Eck, “Adaptive Game-Based Learning,” in Encyclopedia of the
Sciences of Learning, ed. Norbert M. Seel (Boston: Springer, 2012), 106–110.
67. Stetsenko, The Transformative Mind, 192, 193.
68. Ibid., 160.
69. Stetsenko, “Teaching-Learning and Development as Activist Projects of Historical Becoming,” 9.
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historically evolving reality and, in a related move, considering history specifically
in the context of human social practices.”70 Therein, “both culture and nature are
understood as an inherent dimension of human collaborative practices rather than
as outside sources of influence.”71
With his transformative ontology, Vygotsky moves beyond the
“structure–agency dualism”72 inherent in relational ontologies. In collabora-
tive labor, the individual is not adapting to external surroundings in collaboration
with others, but is collaboratively shaping the environment. The relationship is
not reactive, but purposeful. In this collaborative activity, the individual negates
her/his hereditary experience and is “artificially formed.” This artificial formation
is what Vygotsky understands education to be. The human animal, figuratively
speaking, is “artificially” reformed in the process of education and develops a
“second nature” based on the sociocultural reality of the collaborative activity
she/he participates in. The individual is and becomes in collaborative labor by
integrating tools and, therein, negating innate tendencies and endowments. Sig-
nificantly, negating does not mean eliminating, but superseding.73 The transpiring
notion of human nature derived from the individual–environment unit, as well as
the inherent struggle at the heart of this unit (involving negation and reformation),
is a core foundation of Vygotsky’s educational theory.
A Vygotskian Concept of Education
In the first and second parts of this paper I introduced Vygotsky’s concept
of human evolution and outlined how he applied the idea of an “evolutionary
leap” to his theory of individual learning and Development. In Vygotsky’s view, to
summarize, while other animals maintain a reactive, adaptive relationship with
their surroundings, humans purposefully create their surrounding according not
to natural necessity, but within purposeful social practice. The emergent mental
abilities that allow the “leap” into collaborative history-making are different from
“the direct structure of elementary mental processes”74 in that they are integrated
with tools. This difference between humans and other animals, it is important to
note, Vygotsky did not think of as a mere quantitative elaboration of the former’s
cognitive abilities. Instead, Vygotsky emphasizes,
The history of development of each of the higher mental functions is not the direct contin-
uation and further improvement of the corresponding elementary functions, but undergoes a
radical change of direction in development and a subsequent movement of the process to a
completely different plane.75
70. Stetsenko, The Transformative Mind, 161.
71. Ibid., 35.
72. Dafermos, Rethinking Cultural-Historical Theory, 185.
73. Stetsenko, “Personhood”, 149.
74. Vygotsky, The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions, 37.
75. Vygotsky, “Tool and Sign in the Development of the Child,” 42 (emphasis added).
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Above, I proposed that Vygotsky connected his idea of phylogenetic evolution
— and its transcendence in labor — to his concept of education as “the artificial
development of the child.”76 Analogous to the human species taking a “leap”
onto a “new plane,” the individual, through her/his lifetime, can “perform”
developmental “leaps” onto different planes of relating to and acting in her/his
sociocultural reality.
Individual development, in Vygotsky’s view, is the process in which “the child
arms and re-arms himself with widely varying tools.”77 “Leaps” in individual
development occur in negation of hereditary experience, in their transcendence
through the integration of tools in mental processes and actions. Education as the
direction of that process takes a key role within Vygotsky’s evolutionary account
of individual development. Education is the direction of these “leaps”; education,
Vygotsky writes,
is the artificial mastery of natural processes of development. Analogously to the dialectic
relationship between evolution and history in phylogeny, in the life of each individual, the
innate hereditary experience is transformed in an ongoing process marked by negation, leading
to the emergence of higher psychological functions and conceptual thinking. Education not
only influences certain processes of development but restructures all functions of behavior in
a most essential manner.78
Despite the important function of education as a practice aimed at providing
collaborative opportunities and experiences in Vygotsky’s account of individual
learning and development, the nature of the pedagogical relationship appears to
fall to the wayside in interpretations of Vygotsky. The evolutionary framework,
I argue, is able to shed some light on different qualities of learning in relation to
educational practice.
Development versus Learning
It has been established above that Vygotsky thought of individual development
— analogously to his concept of human evolution — as a discontinuous process in
which processes of learning are broken up by “leaps.” To clarify how these “leaps”
are different from learning, and what the role of educational practices might be,
I begin with the crucial difference that Vygotsky makes between learning and
Development.
Vygotsky criticized that, among his contemporaries, “evolution as devel-
opment by gradual and slow accumulation of separate changes continues to
be regarded as the only form of child development.”79 According to Vygotsky,
the concept of development was confounded in psychology due to a “cryptic
evolutionism” dominating a child psychology paradigm in which “evolution and
76. Vygotsky, The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions, 110.
77. Vygotsky, Problems of the Theory and History of Psychology, 88.
78. Ibid. (emphasis added).
79. Vygotsky, The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions, 99.
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revolution seem incompatible.”80 In his own concept of evolution, Vygotsky
merged evolution and revolution in the “socio-biological formation of the child
personality.”81 Evolution, therein, means the mixture between structural matu-
ration, that is, physical processes of growth that enable certain developmental
processes to emerge, and processes of learning that give rise to developmental
“leaps.”82 The ontogenetic manifestations of these “leaps” are the result of a pro-
cess of sociogenesis.83
Consequently, in Vygotsky, there exists a difference between “development, a
qualitative change,” and the processes of learning that it arises from, which are in
themselves “a cumulative change.”84 These qualitative changes, or Developments,
lead to a fundamental change in the “metabolism” of the individual–world unit.
Vygotsky describes this metabolic change as
[t]he new structure of consciousness acquired at a given age [which] inevitably signifies a new
character of perceptions of external reality and activity in it, a new character of the child’s
perceiving his own mental life and the internal activity of his mental functions.85
Development, on his view, is the result of “drama,” of “living performance.”86
Rather than being a gradual, cumulative, and fluid maturation, Development
occurs at certain instances in the individual’s sociogenetic development and the
social context of its participation.87 In Development, “not only the use of tools
is developing, but also a system of movement and perception, the brain and the
hands, the whole organism of the child.”88
As noted, Vygotsky contended that the artificial or educational formation of
the individual is the result of the pronunciation, manifestation, and negation of
innate hereditary tendencies through processes of learning and Development. This
dialectic formation is inherently social, Vygotsky emphasizes: “The path from the
thing to the child and from the child to the thing lies in another person. The
transition from the biological to the social path of development is the central
link in the process of development, a cardinal turning point in the history of
the child’s behavior.”89 Learning, I argue, can be understood as the precursor for
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid., 20.
82. Stetsenko, The Transformative Mind, 25.
83. Michael Glassman, “Dewey and Vygotsky: Society, Experiences, and Inquiry in Educational Prac-
tice,” Educational Researcher 30, no. 4 (2011): 4.
84. Roth and Jornet, Understanding Educational Psychology, 28 (emphasis added).
85. Vygotsky, Child Psychology, 199.
86. Stetsenko, “Darwin and Vygotsky on Development,” 32.
87. Dafermos, Rethinking Cultural-Historical Theory, 175.
88. Vygotsky, The History of the Development of Higher Mental Functions, 21.
89. Ibid., 20 (emphasis added).
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the quantitative transformation of the individual’s mental activity in relation to
collaborative purposes that is Development. What transforms processes of learning
into Development, we gather from Vygotsky’s quote above, is “another person.” It
is not any other person, however. Rather, as I will argue in the following section, in
Vygotsky, Development relies on pedagogical interaction — it relies on a teacher.
The Role of “the Pedagogical” in the Zone of Proximal Development
With the idea of the ZPD, Vygotsky sought to translate his notion of sociogen-
esis into an educational concept. Vygotsky defined the ZPD as the
distance between the level of his [the child’s, AN] actual development, determined with the
help of independently solved tasks, and the level of possible development, defined with the
help of tasks solved by the child under the guidance of adults or in cooperation with more
intelligent peers.90
In the ZPD, learning understood as the quantitative accumulation of histori-
cal experience is transformed into a qualitative “leap”: “the special social situation
that has a crisis-like qualitative change as an outcome is designated in Vygotskian
literature as the zone of proximal development.”91 The ZPD is always contextu-
alized in a particular sociocultural reality. The mind, in that view, “cannot be
conceived as an attribute of an isolated individual,” but must instead be under-
stood as the result of thresholds for Development occasioned by learning processes
“created by social activity.”92
In the ZPD, “another person” presents the individual with ideas and concepts
outside of her/his knowledge that are related to her/his previous experience
(hereditary and historical).93 Prior to this supplementation of previous experience
in interaction, the child forms and reforms unordered “heaps of objects” based
on experience into complexes informed by “concrete-empirical thinking.”94 With
increasing experience, these complexes are connected with other complexes,
forming so-called “pseudo-concepts,” and these pseudo-concepts, in turn, create
the basis for the ZPD in which they are contrasted with scientific, or “true
concepts.”95 With the developmental “leaps” from everyday to scientific concepts,
the child gains increasing voluntary control over the “metabolism” defining the
individual–world unit. They are the foundation of developments that allow the
student “to act in the world in a new way.”96
90. Vygotsky, Child Psychology, 204 (emphasis added).
91. Roth and Jornet, Understanding Educational Psychology, 148.
92. Derry, Vygotsky: Philosophy and Education, 15, 44.
93. Roth and Jornet, Understanding Educational Psychology, 149.
94. Vygotsky, Thinking and Speech, 134, 137.
95. Ibid., 167.
96. Derry, Vygotsky: Philosophy and Education, 76.
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While the social dimension of the ZPD is easily understood, its pedagogical
dimension requires further attention.97 In Vygotsky, as noted in the previous
section, instruction by “another person” has “productive and unique consequences
for development.”98 I argue that, even though Vygotsky points out that, in prin-
ciple, “more intelligent peers” are able to complement everyday concepts with
scientific concepts, and thereby productively “step into” their peer’s ZPD, there is
a specific pedagogical quality to interaction and instruction in the ZPD that can-
not be afforded by peers. With this argumentation I seek to bring out some aspects
of the timely commentary that a Vygotskian perspective makes for a theory of
education and teaching.
I argue that there are at least three factors that fundamentally distinguish
the teacher from the “more mature peer” in the ZPD. First, there is the need
for pedagogical expertise in instruction that cannot be expected from a peer. It
is the grounding premise of the ZPD that teaching does not focus on what the
child can already do by him- or herself, but instead ties on to what the child can
almost do or is able to achieve with the help of others.99 Therefore, “determining
the actual level of development is the most essential and indispensable task in
resolving every practical problem of teaching and educating."100 Even though peers
could technically function as cooperative partners within the ZPD, the teacher’s
pedagogical expertise is a key element that distinguishes the teacher from the peer.
Gert Biesta says “that to learn from someone is a radically different expe-
rience from the experience of being taught by someone.”101 In Vygotsky, that
difference between learning occurring in collaboration with peers, and learning
occurring by being “taught” or instructed, is captured in the concept of obuchenie,
or “instruction-learning.”102 Obuchenie describes a particular quality of learning
that can only be attained through instruction. In the ZPD, a space to be “shown”
the scientific “true concepts” is created, a space to be instructed, enabling a quali-
tative “leap” in the child’s development. Without instruction, the child’s concepts
remain everyday concepts based on direct experience.103 These concepts are infe-
rior to scientific concepts in that they do not allow for the developmental “leap” of
the individual into a transformation- and collaboration-focused relation to her/his
97. Aline Nardo and Dragan Trninic, “Bridging the Theory and Empiry of Learning from Failure,”
Philosophy of Education 76, no. 2 (2020): 179f.
98. Ibid., 71; and Stetsenko, “Teaching-Learning and Development as Activist Projects of Historical
Becoming,” 9.
99. Vygotsky, “Tool and Sign in the Development of the Child,” 198.
100. Ibid., 200.
101. Gert Biesta, “Receiving the Gift of Teaching: From ‘Learning From’ to ‘Being Taught By,’” in Studies
of Philosophy of Education 32 (2013): 457 (emphasis added).
102. Dafermos, Rethinking Cultural-Historical Theory, 165.
103. Derry, Vygotsky: Philosophy and Education, 71.
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sociocultural surroundings.104 In the “leap,” the everyday concepts are negated
through the integration of their more abstract scientific “equivalent,” introducing
the individual to a qualitatively new way of relating to the environment.105
The ZPD, to use the words of Jan Derry, “involves the ‘relocation’ of ideas”106
through instruction, rather than their creation. Individual development, as it has
been discussed at length in the previous part of this paper, is embedded within the
sociocultural reality and the previous hereditary and historical experience of the
individual. If we accept this, the ZPD cannot be viewed as an educational “tech-
nique” or “method” that is able to determine developmental trajectories exter-
nally. Instead, the ZPD has to be understood as a zone of potential that emerges
dialogically between the individual’s current state (consisting of both hereditary
and historical experience), the sociocultural reality, and the teacher’s recogni-
tion of the potential for Development. On this view, teacher-centered instruction
and child-centered learning, top-down and bottom-up processes, merge. The ZPD,
rather than being an artificial construction of the teacher, is the relational result
of the struggles arising from the individual–world unit.107 Intentional instruction
— that is, instruction planned with care and foresight both in terms of the devel-
opmental potential and culture — moves ahead of the student’s development, and
“when it does, it impels or wakens a whole series of functions that are in a stage of
maturation lying in the zone of proximal development.”108 To recognize the ZPD
and to understand how to instruct students accordingly requires a high level of
pedagogical expertise that goes beyond technical know-how and one-size-fits-all
tools and methods for teaching.
Second, besides pedagogical expertise, instruction in the ZPD requires an
advanced familiarity with artifacts. A further developed peer might be able to
help with the supplementation of everyday concepts with scientific concepts, but
lacks the breadth of cultural experience of an adult required to teach tools, not
static artifacts. If we accept that, in a Vygotskian perspective, teaching means
collaborative tool-mediation, rather than the teaching of symbols, systems, and
artifacts predefined in meaning, then the peer — even if she or he is more mature
— cannot reliably be expected to take the role as the instructor in the ZPD.109
Development — that is, the negation of previous ways of interacting with the
world and the formation of a qualitatively different relationship between the
individual and her/his surroundings — occurs if a symbol or tool is integrated
104. Vygotsky, Thinking and Speech, 169.
105. Ibid., 217.
106. Derry, Vygotsky: Philosophy and Education, 96.
107. Roth and Jornet, Understanding Educational Psychology, 247.
108. Vygotsky, “Tool and Sign in the Development of the Child,” 212.
109. Harry Daniels, “Vygotsky and Dialogic Pedagogy,” in Dialogic Pedagogy: The Importance of
Dialogue in Teaching and Learning, ed. David Skidmore and Kyoko Murakami (Tonawanda, NY:
Multilingual Matters, 2016), 63.
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“as a generalized instrument, that is, a psychological tool capable of organizing
individual cognitive and learning functions in different contexts and in application
to different tasks.”110 Without the required openness to co-create this meaning
of the tool, and the “cultural maturity” that allows instruction that is not the
transmission of predefined meaning, the ZPD as I understand it cannot come
into full fruition. “That is why the inability to teach psychological tools in a
transcendent manner inevitably leads to failure in their appropriation by students,”
Alex Kozulin argues.111 This has profound implications for the role of the teacher
and throws up the question of the extent to which the currently prevalent output
orientation in educational practice and policy can allow for meaningful teaching
practices in the sense of Vygotsky. It also puts further emphasis on the difference
between the peer and the teacher, or so-called artificially intelligent “adaptive
learning systems” and the teacher.
This leads me over to discuss the third factor that distinguishes the teacher
from the more mature peer in the ZPD: responsibility. Not only can the peer not
be expected to have the pedagogical and cultural expertise required to recognize
and “furnish” the ZPD, but the peer also cannot be expected to take responsibility
for that process. The teacher is, at least theoretically, able and expected to “show
something new to the student” in a capacity that cannot be expected from the more
intelligent peer; the peer cannot be made responsible for showing something with
pedagogical intentionality. The pedagogical relationship, following Klaus Prange,
is defined by Zeigen (“showing”).112 Collaboration among peers also involves
moments of Zeigen, but these differ from the pedagogical “showing” in that
they are not necessarily intentional.113 In summary, a further developed peer
cannot be expected to recognize emerging ZPDs and exploit them purposefully
and responsibly.114
Pedagogical relationships — that is, relationships between teacher and student
— I conclude, have a unique role within the Development of the individual.115 The
idea that the ZPD’s social dimension can be replaced by an intelligent machine
that provides “the proper cognitive support” for the development of “an effective
schema,”116 in light of the reading developed in this paper, represents a question-
able reduction of the ZPD as a dialogic space. Zeigen — or, as Biesta describes it,
“showing something radically new” — is more than mere adequate preparation
110. Kozulin, “Psychological Tools and Mediated Learning,” 26.
111. Ibid.
112. Prange, Pädagogik als Erfahrungsprozess.
113. Wolfgang Brezinka, Grundbegriffe der Erziehungswissenschaft. Analyse, Kritik, Vorschläge [Basic
concepts of educational science: Analysis, criticism, suggestions] (Munich, Germany: Reinhardt, 1990).
114. Chaiklin, “The Zone of Proximal Development in Vygotsky’s Analysis of Learning and Instruc-
tion,” 43.
115. Derry, Vygotsky: Philosophy and Education, 15.
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of content in order to reach certain predefined outputs. It requires pedagogical
expertise, cultural maturity, and responsibility that cannot be expected from an
artificial agent.
Pedagogical interaction is also of unique importance in how Vygotsky thought
of the evolution of the human species. “The pedagogical problem,” Vygotsky
writes, “stands at the very center of the new viewpoint on the mind of man.”117
The drawn analogy between the evolutionary “leaps” of the species through labor,
and the developmental “leaps” through pedagogical interaction in the individual’s
lifetime, is also effective the other way around: Because humans are able to
be taught and become increasingly self-determined through Developments, the
human evolutionary trajectory is increasingly detached from adaptive pressures.
In the light of current ecological developments, this view seems only partially
convincing. The current climate crisis, for example, makes it alarmingly apparent
that the hope that the intensely technological human reality of today makes us
immune against environmental pressures is, at best, utopian and, at worst, dis-
astrous. The realization of our dependence on Nature and our need to adapt our
own objectives to it seems increasingly pressing. While it is outside the scope of
this paper to expand on this fully, I argue that Vygotskian sociogenesis might actu-
ally provide a fruitful framework to think about education, collaboration and labor
in connection to these ecological crises. Sociogenesis is not purely cultural. It is
connected not only in hereditary experience, but also rooted in ecological develop-
ments. Objectives for interaction and collaboration, in a Vygotskian perspective,
are necessarily embedded in current realities and individual development, as the
mental integration of these collaborative practices, is deeply connected to those
realities of which the current ecological crisis undoubtedly is an inescapable part.
Conclusion
With this paper, I seek to enrich the discussion of Vygotsky’s contribution to
a theory of education. I have argued that the evolutionary focus is able to shed
new light on the significance of educational practices in Vygotsky’s works, and, in
turn, contribute to a widened perspective on some of his most central educational
concepts, such as the ZPD. The evolutionary focus explored in this analysis, I
argue, stands in support of the significance and responsibility of the teacher. I
conclude with a summary of key points and a discussion of the implications of
Vygotsky’s Marxist–Darwinian evolutionism for educational theory.
Vygotsky believed that after a “leap,” the human species was able to alter
its relationship to the world. Instead of merely reacting to external pressures, at
some point in evolution, humankind developed the cognitive capacities to inte-
grate tools into mental activity in order to purposefully transform environments.
Henceforth, “higher mental functions” allowed humans to purposefully transform
environments through the collaborative use of tools. “Owing to the features of
his adaptation (use of tools, work activity), the development of artificial organs
117. Vygotsky, Problems of the Theory and History of Psychology, 148.
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replaced the development of natural organs.”118 In its capacity to be formed not
merely in relation to the environment, but within the practice of purposefully
transforming the environment, the human species is unique in the animal king-
dom.
Vygotsky’s idea of the evolutionary “leap” from adaptation to labor manifests
on the level of individual development as “leaps” from cumulative processes of
learning to Development that enables qualitatively new ways of being and acting in
the world. Developments are marked by the negation of hereditary experiences and
their increasing replacement by historical experience. Education, in Vygotsky, is
the direction of that process of negation. I have argued that pedagogical interaction
is key for understanding the process of negation and the difference between
learning and Development. The ZPD, therein, emerges as a dialogical “zone of
potential,” rather than a mere instructional tool that allows one to externally
determine processes of learning (for example, as in artificially intelligent adaptive
learning systems).
At the same time, this paper wants to problematize a definition of the ZPD
as an entirely symmetric collaborative moment that discards a pedagogical —
and therefore a somewhat asymmetrical — dimension. Stetsenko, for example,
argues that “teaching-learning is the path for students and teachers to together
explore, enact, and realize the process of co-creating their unique identities through
co-creating and co-inventing something novel in our shared world.”119 It is not
my intention to criticize Stetsenko, but to examine the pedagogical nature of
individual development and learning. If pedagogical relationships are understood
as largely symmetrical, they become indistinguishable from other social relations.
On the account presented in this paper, however, the intentional pedagogical act
of Zeigen is essential to the ZPD. Yet, Zeigen implies an asymmetry of pedagogical
expertise, familiarity with cultural artifacts, and pedagogical responsibility.
The pedagogical relationship is asymmetrical in that the student is not
responsible for “showing something new” to the teacher (even though she or he
doubtlessly will do so all the time, as every teacher will know). Vice versa, how-
ever, this responsibility is constitutive of the relationship. Without the pedagogical
expertise of the teacher that allows her/him to recognize developmental thresh-
olds, and her/his willingness to take the responsibility of elevating those thresh-
olds by “showing something new” — something which is a matter of the teacher’s
judgment — the ZPD is reduced to the tailoring of teaching to the imminent needs
of the student. Such a conception of education leaves little space for transcendence
and transformation.
A Vygotskian theory of education, I contend, involves “showing something
new” to the younger generation, according to the developmental potential they
have and given sociocultural and material conditions. Development — that is, the
118. Vygotsky, “Tool and Sign in the Development of the Child,” 16 (emphasis added).
119. Stetsenko, The Transformative Mind, 325.
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qualitative superseding of previous ways of thinking, acting, and knowing — has
a constitutive pedagogical component. Therein, I agree with Biesta’s criticism of
constructivist pedagogies’ understanding of teaching as “facilitation.” Teaching
understood as part of a process of “transcendence,” Biesta maintains, has to “bring
something radically new to the student.”120 Collaboration, dialogue, and student
agency are indispensable for this process to be fruitful — but there is also the
teacher’s responsibility of showing something to the student that they themselves
have not “seen” (as in “discovered”). This “thing” to be shown is within the
responsibility of the teacher. Vygotsky emphasizes: “The child does not create the
complex that corresponds with the meaning of a word but finds it ready made.”121
Tools, to use the words of Kozulin, “are always appropriated in terms of the goals
of the given community.” Kozulin writes further, “if there is no intentionality of
the teacher-mediator, psychological tools will not be appropriated by the students
or will be perceived as another content item, rather than a tool.”122
This paper, rather than making a case for pedagogical authority, seeks to advo-
cate for the recognition of the degrees of expertise, experience, and responsibility
inherent to the practice of teaching, and the complexity of the task of the teacher.
In times where the need for a teacher at all appears to be up for discussion,123 I want
to make a case for the irreplaceability of the teacher in pedagogical interaction —
irreplaceable by a machine, a computer, or a peer. What is unique to the teacher is
pedagogical expertise, cultural familiarity, and pedagogical responsibility.
Teaching, in a Vygotskian perspective, I conclude, is not only qualitatively
different from other social relations when it comes to “the artificial develop-
ment of the child,” but it is also highly challenging as a practice. The con-
nectivity of teaching to Development, rather than learning, which we derive
from an evolutionary reading of Vygotsky, fundamentally puts up for question a
knowledge-centeredcentered conception of teaching and moves to the forefront
the need for pedagogical expertise and responsibility in stepping into developmen-
tal possibilities.124 As Kozulin points out, from Vygotsky, we derive an important
differentiation between learning understood as “content learning,” and Devel-
opment understood as the integration and “appropriation of tools.”125 In Vygot-
sky, the learning processes sparked through cultural initiation in teaching only
lead to Development if knowledge, cultural habits, and sociocultural artifacts are
120. Biesta, “Receiving the Gift of Teaching,” 449.
121. Vygotsky, Thinking and Speech, 145.
122. Kozulin, “Psychological Tools and Mediated Learning,” 29, 26.
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transmitted in their capacity as tools. This puts a focus on the pedagogical act
of Zeigen, which goes far beyond the transmission of current knowledge or the
provision of a predefined curriculum of cultural artifacts. The ZPD is not an arti-
ficially created learning process, but the purposeful and pedagogical stepping into
a contingent zone of revolutionary possibility.
